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This article is a brief introduction (further posts on this topic to come!) regarding an 
enduring legal question associated with the exercise of ‘non-statutory executive 
powers’. These powers, also called the ‘prerogative powers’, are exercised by the 
Commonwealth Government (‘Government’) by virtue of s 61 of the Commonwealth 
Constitution and allows the Government to exercise its ‘prerogative’ over issues 
that fall outside of the jurisdiction of Parliament and the judiciary – such as decisions 
involving how to deal with terrorism, declarations of war and so on (more on this 
below). At times when the Government is exercising these powers, the question that 
arises is how much, and to what extent must the Government ensure that procedural 
fairness is given to persons whose interests might be adversely affected by the 
exercise of those non-statutory powers? 
The problem lies in the fact that non-stat powers are exercised generally in absence 
of specific laws/ regulations that govern an individual’s rights. In other words the 
exercise of non-stat exec powers allows a discretion on the part of the executive and 
it is these discretionary aspects that pose the greatest threat to freedom – particularly 
for vulnerable individuals. This situation was highlighted in a recent decision by the 
High Court of Australia (‘HCA’) involving a Sri Lankan national detained at sea and 
later transported to a detention centre on Cocos Islands by the Australian Border Force 
pursuant to the Maritime Protection Act 2013 (Cth). 
In the decision of CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Court 
reiterated the long held view that the Government is not entitled to ‘unconstrained’ 
exercise of non-statutory executive power and ‘must bear in mind its character as an 
element of the grant of power contained in the Constitution, s 61’. Unfortunately the 
Court provided no further explanation regarding the limits of excluding procedural 
fairness at times when the executive is exercising its non-statutory executive powers. 
What are non-statutory executive powers? 
The exercise of non-statutory executive power—also known as the prerogative 
power—is provided for in s 61 of the Constitution.[1] Section 61 provides the 
necessary ‘executive power’ to the executive government not otherwise provided for 
by statute. Non-statutory executive powers are those powers that are used by the 
Government, for example, in keeping the peace, national security, declarations of war, 
border protection and a vast array of other issues associated with sovereignty.[2] 
Despite the existence of this prerogative power, Winterton asserts that the executive 
power ‘has been something of a mystery, frequently defined merely as the “residue” 
of governmental powers after legislative and judicial powers are 
excluded’.[3] Winterton, in his seminal volume on the analysis of the executive power 
in Australia, describes that the limits of executive power are ascertained according to 
its ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ within the Australian constitutional law framework. The 
‘breadth’ for which Winterton refers is the Commonwealth power ascertained relative 
to the powers of the States, and the ‘depth’ being the limits imposed on the executive 
by the separation of powers.[5] Accordingly, so long as the power is one that falls 
within the ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ as provided for under this framework, the exercise of 
a non-statutory power will be lawful. 
An area of executive decision-making where the extent and scope of the executive 
power is not clear, lies in respect of the powers of the executive regarding situations 
where the executive may avoid or disregard aspects of procedural fairness in matters 
affecting individual rights and freedoms. This question was discussed in a recent case 
involving a Sri Lankan national detained at sea by the newly formed Commonwealth 
Border Protection Force.[4] The Sri Lankan man was part of a group of 157 Sri Lankan, 
mostly Tamil, asylum seekers. The man was later transported to detention on Cocos 
Islands by the Australian Border Force pursuant to the Maritime Protection Act 2013 
(Cth). 
One question that arose for the Court was whether the Government could remove 
aspects of procedural fairness to the individual? As part of the judgment, the Court 
discussed the history and the rationale of non-stat prerogative powers. However, 
unfortunately, the Court stopped short of making any pronouncement on the nature 
and scope of the s 61 prerogative powers and the exclusion of procedural fairness—
primarily due to the fact that the Court ultimately held that the Government in this case 
was acting under statute rather than in exercise of any prerogative powers. The extent 
of procedural fairness that is to be afforded to an individual when the executive is 
exercising its prerogative powers remains an unsettled question but one that is crucial 
in understanding the extent of executive power vis a vis individual rights—particularly 
in an environment of heightened political anxiety surrounding unlawful maritime 
arrivals and terrorism. 
[1]Australian Constitution s 61 – The Executive power of the Commonwealth is vested 
in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s 
representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, 
and of the laws of the Commonwealth. 
[2] Leslie Zines, ‘The Inherent Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ (2005) 
16 Public Law Review 279, 286-292. See also, George Winterton, Parliament, the 
Executive and the Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 120-2. 
Winterton asserts that there is great uncertainty regarding the extent to which the 
prerogative can be applied to new situations such as terrorism and new forms of 
warfare. On this point, Winterton appears to equivocate—on the one hand he cites the 
authority of Lord Reid in Burmah Oil Co (Burmah Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] 
AC 75, 108 supported by Diplock LJ’s judgment in British Broadcasting Corporation v 
Johns [1965] Ch 32 that strongly suggests that new prerogatives are not able to be 
created. While on the other hand, Winterton acknowledges that the prerogative is part 
of the common law and therefore has the capacity to develop and evolve with new 
situations. On this point, he cites Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94, 134-5 per 
Windeyer J;Jolley v Mainka (1933) 49 CLR 242, 281-2 per Evatt J; Attorney-General 
v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, 565. 
[3] George Winteron, ‘The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and 
Executive Power’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 21, 21-2. 
[4] CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 89 ALJR 207. 
[5] George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-
General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 29-30. For a detailed analysis regarding 
the ‘depth’ and ‘breadth’ aspects, see, especially chapters 2 and 3. 
 
